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Mitigation: The NEMESYS Approach
Omer H. Abdelrahman, Erol Gelenbe, Go¨kc¸e Go¨rbil and Boris Oklander
Abstract Mobile malware and mobile network attacks are becoming a significant
threat that accompanies the increasing popularity of smart phones and tablets. Thus
in this paper we present our research vision that aims to develop a network-based
security solution combining analytical modelling, simulation and learning, together
with billing and control-plane data, to detect anomalies and attacks, and eliminate
or mitigate their effects, as part of the EU FP7 NEMESYS project. These ideas are
supplemented with a careful review of the state-of-the-art regarding anomaly detec-
tion techniques that mobile network operators may use to protect their infrastructure
and secure users against malware.
1 Introduction
Mobile malware is emerging as a significant threat due to the increasing popular-
ity of smart phones and tablets, which now run fully-fledged operating systems
(OSs) on powerful hardware and feature multiple interfaces and sensors. Personal
computers (PCs) are no longer the dominant computing platform, and indeed the
global shipments of smart phones alone have exceeded those of desktop computers
since 2011 [7]. Further, with the accelerated adoption of 4G technologies including
WiMAX and LTE, cellular devices will become the primary means of broadband
Internet access for many users. In fact, while 4G capable devices represent only
0.9% of all global mobile connections observed in the Internet during 2012, they al-
ready account for 14% of the mobile data traffic [8]. As more and more people move
from PCs to handheld devices, cyber criminals are naturally shifting their attention
to the mobile environment, and this trend is fuelled by the availability of off-the-
shelf malware creation tools [5] as well as the proliferation of mobile application
O. H. Abdelrahman · E. Gelenbe · G. Go¨rbil · B. Oklander
Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Imperial College, London SW7 2BT, UK
email: o.abd06@imperial.ac.uk
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
5.
42
10
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
8 M
ay
 20
13
2 O. H. Abdelrahman et al.
(shortly known as app) marketplaces, enabling the distribution of malicious apps to
potentially millions of users [31]. Such mobile malware can attempt to snoop and
steal saleable information, generate revenue by calling premium rate numbers, or
perform other malicious activities.
Despite this growing challenge, operators continue to be reactive rather than
proactive towards these security threats [2], and investments in detection and mitiga-
tion techniques specific to mobile networks are only implemented when a problem
occurs. In this position paper regarding certain research activities of the EU FP7
project NEMESYS [21], we describe our approach to the research and development
of anomaly detection techniques so that mobile network operators may protect their
own infrastructure and defend users against malware. The techniques that opera-
tors may develop and deploy on their networks can constitute value-added services
for communities of users, in the same way that banks use profiling to reduce credit
card fraud. If deployed at the network rather than mobile devices, such services will
also spare mobile device batteries and bandwidth (both computational and commu-
nication). In fact, most users are not aware of the growing security risks with mobile
devices [3], but it is in the interest of operators to ensure that users are well protected
since large scale malware infections pose a significant threat to the availability and
security of cellular networks. Network level analysis also provides a broad view of
malicious activities within an operator’s network, is not vulnerable to exploits that
allow malware to circumvent client-side security, and can be modified easily without
requiring users to install patches and updates.
In the sequel, we first present our vision about how to address this field of re-
search in the context of NEMESYS for a network-based security solution which
combines modelling and learning, and uses network measurements as well as
control-plane and billing data to detect and evaluate anomalies and attacks. Then
we review the recent literature on attacks targeting services and users of mobile net-
works, and outline the merits and limitations of existing network- and cloud-based
anomaly detection techniques. Finally we draw some conclusions.
2 The NEMESYS Model-based Approach
The research we are conducting with regard to anomaly detection and mitigation
within the NEMESYS project uses a model-based approach that involves represent-
ing how the communication system functions at the level of each mobile connection.
The model-based approach is motivated by several factors. First, the number of mo-
bile users that we need to monitor and deal with in real time is very large. Thus a
clear and understandable uniform approach is needed to deal with each individual
mobile call, emphasising the similarities and common parameters. Anomalies can
then be detected via deviations from normal parameters or behaviours. Second, the
computational tools that are being developed for anomaly detection and mitigation
need to be based on sound principles; mathematical models allow us to evaluate
and validate such algorithms based on clear underlying model assumptions, even
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though the use of these models in various practical situations will include condi-
tions when some of the model assumptions are not satisfied. Thus mathematical
models will need to be tested and validated through simulation and practical mea-
surements. Third, due to the sheer size of the systems we need to deal with, the
mathematical models will have to be decomposable, both in terms of obtaining an-
alytical and numerical solutions, e.g. in terms of product forms [19], and in terms
of distributed processing for reasons of scalability [1]. Again, the mathematical and
decomposable structure also provides a handle for decomposing and distributing the
computational tasks.
The focus of model construction is on identifying and modelling the individual
steps that a mobile user makes regarding:
• Call establishment, including the connection to base stations, access points, and
call management,
• Monitoring and billing, and the interactions between the mobile operator’s re-
sources and the network for monitoring and billing,
• Accesses that the call may make to sensitive resources such as web sites for priv-
ileged information interrogation,
• Call processing or service steps that may require that the mobile user identity
itself to the network or external resources, or provide other sensitive information
(e.g. personal addresses) at certain operational steps,
• The access to web sites that are used for purchasing and billing.
Indeed, in order to develop detection capabilities of a practical value it is vital to for-
mulate a unified analytical framework which explicitly describes the main internal
resources of the network architecture, including both the internal aspects regarding
base station, access points and call management and billing, and the sensitive exter-
nal resources that the mobile user may access during its call. Since our approach
will have to be effective in situations where hundreds of thousands of mobile users
may be active in a given network simultaneously, we need to address both:
• The case where only a small percentage of mobile users come under attack at a
given time, but these attacks are nevertheless of high value to the attacker so that
we must be able to detect relatively rare events in a very large ensemble, a little
like detecting a small number of hidden explosive devices in a very large and
potentially dangerous terrain, also
• Situations where attacks affect the signaling system and are significantly disturb-
ing a large fraction of the ongoing mobile connections.
In all cases we will need to deal with real-time detection, mitigation and possibly
attack elimination, as well as data collection for deferred ulterior analysis.
2.1 Modelling
Research in communication systems has a solid background of modelling method-
ologies such as stochastic processes, queueing systems, graph models, etc. These
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methods are routinely and successfully utilised to describe communication systems
and to analyse and improve their performance, but they are rarely used for secu-
rity. Our research plan for anomaly detection incorporates modelling of the wireless
communication network at different levels of abstraction to properly represent the
components and the processes that are prone to anomalous behaviour.
The natural choice for this approach is multi-class queueing and diffusion mod-
els [10, 17] and related methods. Such models provide estimates of both averages
and variances of the times that it would take to undertake signaling or call pro-
cessing functions, as well as of access times to web sites and other services, in the
presence of a large population of mobile users in the network, once the average ser-
vice times and task sequences are known. For a given (small) subset of users which
one wishes to monitor, if the estimated average quantities for a population scaled up
to the current observed numbers in the network, for the same user set, deviates sig-
nificantly from the current measured values in the network, then one can infer some
level of anomaly. The estimates for the scaled up population can be calculated from
the queueing models in a very fast and straightforward manner, leading to a use-
ful modelling based anomaly detector. This performance based approach can also
provide billing estimates based on the utilisation and durations related to internal
and external resources, so that the queueing model results can map into billing in-
formation: once again, deviations from the expected values (even in the presence of
large traffic loads) can be estimated by comparing model predictions with measured
observations.
In addition to the above approach, some of the analysis may require more effort
because contrary to standard approaches that obtain the steady-state behaviour, the
detection of anomalies may require detection of change that is time dependent and
thus requires transient or rare event analysis. In order to address the rise of the
resulting computational complexity, we also plan to utilise the learning capabilities
of the Random Neural Network (RNN) [11, 12, 14–16, 20], which has previously
been applied to a variety of complex problems. The RNN’s mathematical analogy to
a queueing and communication network will ease the design of learning techniques
that have to mimic the behaviour of mobile calls in a wireless network with its
different resources and customers.
2.2 Simulation Tools
Our analytical models and anomaly detection algorithms will be augmented and
validated with simulation tools. As an initial step, we are developing realistic simu-
lations of UMTS and LTE networks using the OPNET simulator in order to extract
data regarding control-plane events that take place during normal mobile communi-
cations. For this purpose, we are currently modelling a small-scale mobile network
and all control-plane protocols in the packet-switched domain, including mobility,
session and radio resource management. Characteristics of these control events will
be used to drive the development of our analytical models. We will later increase
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the scale of our simulations to validate our mathematical results. For performance
reasons in this stage, instead of simulating communications and events of all mo-
bile users, we will identify the generic characteristics of a large number of users
and use these to generate background traffic on the network while explicitly simu-
lating a smaller set of users, among which only a few may demonstrate anomalous
behaviour. Another set of simulations will include billing system components to
monitor monetary use of internal and external network resources, and based on data
traces and parameters obtained from real mobile networks, these simulations will
be used to generate synthetic data for the learning methods we plan to apply and
to test the performance of our real-time and offline anomaly detection methods. Fi-
nally, we will employ simulation as a tool for the integration and validation of other
system components which are developed by NEMESYS partners, such as the attack
correlation and visualisation & analysis modules [34].
3 Prior Work on Network Threats and Mitigation
Mobile networks are vulnerable to a form of denial-of-service (DoS) attack known
as signaling attacks in which the control plane is overloaded through low-rate traf-
fic patterns that exploit vulnerabilities in the signaling procedures involved in pag-
ing [41], transport of SMS [9] and radio resource control [29] (see [39] for a review
on the subject). In principle, signaling attacks can be carried out either by compro-
mising a large number of mobile devices as in the case of distributed DoS attacks
on wired networks [18] or from outside the network (e.g. the Internet) by targeting
a hit list of mobile devices through carefully timed traffic bursts. In order to orches-
trate such attacks, active probing can be used to infer the radio resource allocation
policies of operational networks [4, 36] as well as to identify a sufficient number
of IP addresses in a particular location [37]. Moreover, a study [37, 43] of 180 cel-
lular carriers around the world revealed that 51% of them allow mobile devices to
be probed from the Internet. Despite their feasibility, signaling attacks are yet to be
observed in practice, which is likely due to the lack of financial incentives for cy-
ber criminals who would rather have the infrastructure functional in order to launch
profitable attacks. A related threat known as signaling storms occur often as a result
of poorly designed popular mobile apps that repeatedly establish and tear down data
connections, generating huge levels of signaling traffic capable of crashing a mobile
network. Thus signaling storms have the same effect as a DoS attack [13, 18], but
without the malicious intent, and they are becoming a serious threat to the avail-
ability and security of cellular networks. For example, a Japanese mobile operator
suffered a major outage in 2012 [38], which was attributed to an Android VoIP app
that constantly polls the network even when users are inactive. Moreover, accord-
ing to a recent survey of mobile carriers [2], many of them have reported outages or
performance issues caused by non-malicious but misbehaving apps, yet the majority
of those affected followed a reactive approach to identify and mitigate the problem.
Note that unlike flash crowds, which normally happen and last for a short period of
6 O. H. Abdelrahman et al.
time coinciding with special occasions such as New Year’s Eve, signaling storms
are unpredictable and tend to persist until the underlying problem is identified and
corrected. This has prompted the mobile industry to promote best practices for de-
veloping network-friendly apps [22, 27]. However, the threat posed by large scale
mobile botnets cannot be eliminated in this manner, as botmasters care more about
increasing their revenue and stealthiness than the impact that their activities have on
the resources of mobile networks.
Countermeasures: signaling problems have a limited impact on the data plane and
thus are difficult to detect using traditional intrusion detection systems which are
effective against flooding type attacks. For Internet-based attacks, a change detec-
tion algorithm using the cumulative sum method has been proposed in [29], where
the signaling rate of each remote host is monitored and an alarm is triggered if this
rate exceeds a fixed threshold. The use of a single threshold for all users, however,
presents a trade-off between false positives and detection time, which can be diffi-
cult to optimise given the diversity of users’ behaviour and consumption. A super-
vised learning approach is used in [23] to detect mobile-initiated attacks whereby
transmissions that trigger a radio access bearer setup procedure are monitored, and
various features are extracted relating to destination IP and port numbers, packet
size, variance of inter-arrival time, and response-request ratio. One problem with
supervised learning techniques is that both normal and malicious behaviours need
to be defined in advance, rendering them ineffective against new and sophisticated
types of attacks. Detection of SMS flooding attacks is considered in [28], where low
reply rate is used as the main indicator of malicious activities, which is likely to
misclassify SMS accounts used for machine-to-machine (M2M) communications,
such as asset tracking and smart grid meters [33].
3.1 Attacks Against Mobile Users
A recent report by Kaspersky [32] revealed that the most frequently detected mal-
ware threats affecting Android OS are SMS trojans, adwares and root exploits. Mo-
bile botnets are also emerging as a serious threat because of their dynamic nature,
i.e. they could be used to execute any action at the command of a botmaster. In the
following we summarise the various approaches that have been proposed to enable
mobile operators to detect attacks against users.
Network level analysis has been explored in a number of recent studies focusing
on three aspects:
• Domain Name System (DNS): Since malware typically uses DNS to retrieve IP
addresses of servers, detecting and blacklisting suspicious domains can be a first
step towards limiting the impact of malware [25, 30]. However, detection should
not be based solely on historical data (i.e. known malicious domains), but also on
behavioural characteristics such as host changes and growth patterns which may
differentiate normal and abnormal traffic.
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• Call Charging Records (CDR): One of the key characteristics of mobile com-
munications pertains to the fact that the whole extent of exchanged traffic load
is continuously monitored for billing and accounting purposes. Hence, it is ex-
pected that many malicious activities will have an evident impact on the CDR
of the parties involved. In [33], communication patterns of SMS spammers are
compared to those of legitimate mobile users and M2M connected appliances,
showing evidence of spammer mobility, voice and data traffic resembling the be-
haviour of normal users, as well as similarities between spammers and M2M
communication profiles. Fuzzy-logic is used in [42] to detect SMS spamming
botnets by exploiting differences in usage profiles, while in [44] SMS anomalies
are detected through building normal social behaviour profiles for users, but the
learning technique fails to identify transient accounts used only for malicious pur-
poses. Markov clustering of international voice calls [26] indicates that different
fraud activities, such as those carried by malicious apps with automated dialler or
via social engineering tactics, exhibit distinct characteristics.
• Content matching: Uncommon header flags and syntactic matches in HTTP mes-
sages can be used as indicators of data exfiltration attempts [25], but this approach
is not effective when end-to-end encryption is used, as it relies on extracting in-
formation from plain-text transmissions.
Cloud-based detection offers a trade-off between network level analysis and on-
device security: the former imposes zero-load on the device, but limits its scope to
cellular data, while the latter is able to utilise internal mobile events for detection but
is resource hungry. There are two main approaches, both of which offload intensive
security analysis and computations to the cloud. The first uses a thin mobile client to
extract relevant features from the device [40] including free memory, user activity,
running processes, CPU usage and sent SMS count, which are then sent to a remote
server for inspection. An example is Crowdroid [6] which collects system calls of
running apps and sends them preprocessed to a server that applies a clustering algo-
rithm to differentiate between benign and trojanised apps. Although this approach
can offer heavy-weight security mechanisms to devices that may not otherwise have
the processing power to run them, it still requires continuous monitoring, some pro-
cessing and frequent communication with a cloud service, thus limiting its utility.
In the second approach [24, 35, 45] an exact replica of the mobile device is stored
in a virtual environment in the cloud, and the system consists of three modules:
(i) a server applying heavy-weight security analyses on the replica, such as virus
scanning [35, 45] and off-the-shelf intrusion detection systems [24, 35]; (ii) a proxy
duplicating incoming traffic to the mobile device, and forwarding it to the mirror
server; and (iii) a tracer on the mobile recording and offloading all necessary infor-
mation needed to replay execution on the replica. The advantage of this approach
is that it can leverage existing complex security solutions, but the processing and
energy costs of synchronising the entire state of a device are prohibitive.
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4 Conclusions
The goal of the NEMESYS project is to develop a novel security framework for
gathering and analysing information about the nature of cyber-attacks targeting mo-
bile devices and networks, and to identify abnormal events and malicious network
activity [21]. Thus this paper summarises our proposed approaches to the analysis
of network traffic and the development of anomaly detection algorithms, combin-
ing modelling and learning using network measurements, control-plane and billing
data. Since network threats often map into congestion in the signaling system, we
will use queueing models to understand bottlenecks in signaling protocols to iden-
tify and predict abnormal traffic patterns that arise in such phenomena. In addition,
we will develop efficient algorithms to detect and classify attacks based on semi-
supervised and unsupervised learning, that can process massive amounts of signal-
ing and billing data in real-time, allowing the early warning of abnormal activities.
Finally, we will use the OPNET simulator to run tests and identify possible issues,
to contribute to the adjustment of network operational parameters and help mitigate
such threats.
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